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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Managerial positions are those which encompass such functions as
planning, directing, controlling, appraising, and supervising work or
people or both.

Although the specific duties of these positions as well

as their level of responsibility vary, they are all performed within the
managerial hierarchy.
These positions have not always had the careful analysis and
problem-solving salary procedures applied to them or have not always been
given the same degree of attention as early as nonrnanagerial jobs.

Job

evaluation techniques were first applied to nonsupervisory in most organizations and, in some, are still only applied there.

Incentive pay appli-

cability to upper level jobs is still being argued in some circles.

The

income tax burden of executives has not always been properly in focus in
considering ways and means of improving income retention potentials.
Fortunately, an even increasing number of organizations today are seeking methods for solving the problems of rate structures and levels, financial motivation, and income retention more than ever before.I
Incentive pay plans for managerial employees currently are receiving more than the normal amount of attention from corporate top
management.

Three primary reasons account for the present interest:

(1) the search for new devices to stimulate improvements in corporate
1Elizabeth Lanham, Administration of Wages and Salaries (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963), p. 421.
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profit performance, (2) the need to evaluate the value and effectiveness
of plans and the expense they represent because of increasing costs and
skrinking profits, and (3) the effect of plans on differentials between
total compensation of managers and their subordinates which have narrowed
in recent years.
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast five basic
stock plans used in executive compensation.
are:

The five basic stock plans

(1) phantom stock; (2) stock option; (3) stock warrant;

bonus; and,

(4) stock

(5) stock purchase. For ease of presentation, the discus-

sion of the stock option and warrant is incorporated into one area because of their close similarities.

The paper itself is divided into

three sections, the introduction, the plans, and summary and conclusions.
The introductory section will state the purpose of the paper and
briefly outline what is to be covered in the remainder of this endeavor.
The main body of this paper goes into detail regarding the four main
topics to be covered.

In this section each of the stock plans will be

examined regarding what each is and how they are used.

Also, in this

section, an attempt is made to point out the advantages and disadvantages
of each.

It is not the purpose of this paper to determine which of these

is the "best," so each one will be presented on it's own merits.

In the

summary and conclusions section each of the four main plans is highlighted and by use of two exhibits an attempt is made to show in what categories and to what degree these plans may differ.

CHAPTER II
THE ANALYSIS OF THE STOCK PLANS
Phantom Stock
A phantom stock plan gives some of the advantages of stock ownership to an executive but does not transfer any stock to him.
is msde of the phantom shares credited to the participant.

A record
He then re-

ceives dividends as any bona fide stockholders do.
Basically, phantom stock enables executives to profit from company shares that they do not own--shares, in fact, tha.t may not even
exist.

The profit may be in one of several forms.

In the simplest, the

executive is awarded units of a certain number of :imaginary shares of
company stock and receives every year a sum equal to the dividends on
these shares.

The payments are usually accumulated in the executive's

account until he retires, although several companies pay out cash every
year.

In variations on this theme, in addition to the dividend equiva-

lents, the executive may also be given the market appreciation of the
non-existent shares over the years on the actual shares on a deferred
basis.
Thus, while the msrket flucuation of the company's stock can affect the executive's overall compensation, he is assured of a payoff year
after year as long as the company keeps paying dividends.

Companies that

give phantom stock to executives strive to keep those dividends coming;
most, indeed, have succeeded in increasing them considerably over the
years.
3
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Phantom stock plans, though little publicized, are not really
new.

They have been around for over fifteen years, and among the long-

time users are DuPont, General Motors, Union Carbide, Koppers, Bethlehem
Steel, and Eastman Kodak.
Under present conditions, phantom stock may be the most practical
compensation gimmick around.

Stock options, for example, while still far

from dead lost a good deal of their appeal with the tax changes of 1969,
and a lot more in the market,

Moreover, stockholders tend to be highly

critical about stock option awards, not to mention those six figure executive salaries and bonuses, particularly when they are already unhappy
over market losses and falling earnings.

But they are less likely to

complain about compensation based on dividends--a benefit they also receive and would themselves like to see get bigger every year.
What is really interesting about phantom stock awards is their
cumulative effect.

Not only does the executive collect the dividends on

his units every time the company makes a payout, he can be awarded new
units year after year.

As units are added to units, and dividend pay-

outs to dividend payouts, the executive's account can build up spectacularly.
The real advantage of phantom plans for the executive is that
he is not required to risk a cent of his own money and so never has to
worry about financing.

Even in the plans that include stock, it is

never the executive's own cash that is risked; the company provides the
stock,

Compare this to the plight of the executive with stock options

caught in the tight money-bear market syndrome.
There are other benefits as well.
familiar realm of taxes.

Not the least of these is the

For the company, phantom distributions, unlike

those made under qualified stock option plans, are tax deductible when
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the money is paid out.

For the recipient, as with any other type of

deferred compeneation, he pays no tax: until after he is retired, when
his income will almost certainly be lower.

He then has to pay regular

income tax: and not the capital gains rate of the qualified stock option.
The 1969 Tax: Reforms have made the capital gains benefit less attractive
for many top executives.

Moreover, having that tax: money working for

him during all the years before retirement, is a marked advantage.
Taking a closer look at the types of phantom stock plans, there
are four major variations.
lent plan.
him.

EX.AMPLE:

The simplest is the straight dividend equiva-

Say a man has a bonus award of $15,000 coming to

He decides he will take $5,000 in cash and have the rest deferred •

.An account is set up for him in units equal to the number of shares

$10,000 would buy.

From then on, whenever the company declares a divi-

dend, he collects the equivalent amount on each of those units.

And it

is all added to his account, to be paid out after he retires.
In the second type of plan, the executive can do even better,
Along with his dividend equivalents, he gets the market appreciation, if
any, that would have been his had he owned actual rather than phantom
shares over the years.

(The underlying value of the shares themselves

reverts to the company when he leaves).

Take an executive who at the

year end is credited with 500 phantom shares at $20 each,

If the mar-

ket price of the stock rises to $50 by the time he retires or departs,
his appreciation comes to $30 on each of those phantom shares--plus, of
course, a smaller amount on any phantom shares granted him later when
the stock was at, say, $25, or $45,

But he gets no appreciation at all

on any shares awarded him when the market price was above the price at
the time he leaves ($50),
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In the third variant, the executive eventually gets to own some
actual shares.
ferred stock.

For with his dividends equivalents, he is granted deAgain, the shares may not physically exist during his

years with the company.

But when he retires, the company provides them,

and he goes into retirement with the whole package--accumulated dividends plus stock.

Obviously, the market's ups and downs will determine

the worth of the shares.
The fourth phantom type differs only slightly.

Here the execu-

tive again benefits over the years from company stock he does not own,
and eventually gets title to an equivalent number of shares.

But the

dividend equivalents, instead of being deferred, are given to him each
year in cash.

Consequently, they constitute ordinary income to him in

the year in which they are paid, and are thus subject to full tax at that
time.
Unlike stock obtained with options, performance shares (phantom
stock) cost the executive nothing, making them a benefit in good markets
and bad.

They are awarded to key executives, usually every other year,

in the form of phantom shares in bookkeeping units, but are not actually
paid until the end of a performance period.
But performance shares may never be paid at all.

This would hap-

pen if the executive fails to measure up in his own performance or if he
leaves the company.

It would also happen if the company's performance,

usually measured in earnings per share, does not meet predetermined
goals.

The performance share is thus a kindofstock bonus, but with the

reward based on long term goals instead of a one year objective. 1

111 Performance Shares:
Week, May 5, 1973.

Popular - but Under Fire,"

Business
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Stock Options
A stock option granted by a corporation to one of its executives
stipulates that he may purchase from the firm, at any time within a
stated period, a given number of shares of its stock at a price fixed on
.

the dat e of grant ing.

l

Since the economic benefit the executive ulti-

mately derives from such an arrangement depends directly on the future
price behavior of his company's stock, the option has associated a high
degree of uncertainty and is, for that reason, particularly difficult
to analyze.
Stock options have, in one form or another, been used to reward
executives for a good many years.

Their real popularity, however, dates

from 1950 when legislation was enacted providing them with favorable and
assured tax treatment and establishing definite ground rules for their
design.

Since then, virtually all option agreements have conformed to

those guidelines.
Prior to 1950, a 1945 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court and a
1946 ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue required that the difference between the market value of stock and its option price be considered as ordinary income taxable at regular rates at the time the employee
exercised his option rights.
A 1950 revision in the Internal Revenue Act resulted in widespread adoption of restricted stock option plans.

The change in the

law created one of the best possibilities for tax saving on executive
compensation.
The 1950 rule states that if a company offers its employees an
option to buy stock at not less than

85%

of market value at the time of

purchase, profit from the stock is not taxed until the stock is sold
1Wilbur G. Lewellen, Executive Com ensation in Large Industrial
Corporations (New York: Columbia University Press, 19
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and the profit received.
tax rates.
less than

The profit is taxed then at regular income

If the organization offers its stock to employees at not

95%

of market value, any profit from the stock is not taxed

until the stock is sold.

The profit is taxed at that time as long term

capital gains rather than at regular income tax rates.
Additional requirements under the law for qualifying for the tax
benefit are:

(1) the stock must be held at least two years from the time

the option is offered and for a minimum of six months after the option
is exercised; (2) eligibility to participate depends on the issuing company and taking up his option during his employment or not later than
three months after termination of his employment; (3) the option right
cannot be transferred except by will or interstate succession laws;

(4)

any employee is ineligible who owns more than 10% of the combined

voting power of all classes of stock of the issuing company or its subsidiaries.
Common stock is generally the class of stock offered in option
plans because its earnings are closely linked to the prosperity of the
company.

Therefore, ownership of common stock, bought on favorable

terms, often serves to stimulate greater efforts on the company's behalf.
Participation in the plan is usually limited to the top echelon
of management.

These executives ordinarily are in a better position to

contribute to the profit a company can make, they are in a high enough
tax bracket that real tax savings can ensue, and they are most apt to
be able to afford to exercise the option.
ing the individual participants are:

Typical bases used for select-

(1) present and potential value to

the organization; (2) responsibility for future growth, development, and
financial success of the company; and, (3) the position held and its
value to the company.
The number of shares offered to a participant may be based upon
the amount of his base salary, his performance, or by special agreement
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or contract with him
Within the general framework indicated, an option plan could be
designed quite flexibly to fit the needs of both the individual executive and his firm.

In most cases the maximum period permitted under the

law was taken advantage of and the option stipulated to be exercisable,
at the optionee 1 s discretion, at any time up to ten years from the date
it was granted, either in a single block or in several installments.
Depending on the corporation's objectives, a shorter time limit was occasionally adopted, and provision was sometimes made for a fixed sequence
of exercises.

For example, one-tenth of the total number of optioned

shares might be eligible for purchase by the executive during the first
year of the agreement, a second one-tenth during the following year, and
so on.
The essence of a stock option is, of course, the opportunity it
provides for its recipient to purchase marketable securities at a discount.

He is placed in a position where he can do something other inves-

tors cannot and is thereby able to employ his investible funds in a
superior manner.

There are, however, two possible conceptual approaches

to measuring the extent of the advantage which he enjoys.
The first is to treat the option as, in effect, a long term
"call" option and therefore to fix its value to the executive as of the
date it is granted.

The argument would be that the right to purchase

shares of stock at an established price anytime within a period of up to
ten years is clearly worth something in and of itself at the time it is
created regardless of the actual results subsequently obtained from its
exercise.

The second point concerns the applicability of such a procedure
to an actual compensation situation--an issue which has been stressed in

;
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connection with the current income equivalents of other rewards.

Given

the difficulties involved in estimating future stock prices, it seems
unlikely that any predictive formula adopted here would be widely used
by businessmen or, even where accepted, that its parameters could be
agreed upon in practice by both parties to particular compensation transactions.

Thus, one can imagine the difficulty that would be encountered

by a corporate compensation administrator in attempting to reach agreement with his company's executives on the ex ante value of their proposed
stock options.

Now, it is true that the current equivalents developed

above for pension and deferred compensation arrangements have some ex
ante elements.

It is also true that the relevant contingencies have

been analyzed so extensively with the aid of large amounts of data that
the necessary conceptual framework and its empirical implementation are
no longer subjects of controversy.

Whenever an appraisal of such contin-

gencies is called for, then, it can be made with both confidence and precision.

A similar claim is not yet possible for ex ante stock price

estimates.
Stock warrants will now be discussed briefly because of their
close similarity to stock options.

The stock warrant plan is one in

which an organization sells a warrant to an executive granting him the
right to buy a specified number of shares of stock at a certain price
within a definite period of time.
ment.

The warrant is a negotiable instru-

Therefore, the holder may sell it if he desires when the value

of the stock increases over the price offered in the warrant and secure
a profit which is taxed as capital gain and not as ordinary income.
Stock warrant plans are offered as a substitute for regular stock
option plans in some organizations because some executives cannot afford
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financially to exercise their option.

Under the warrant plan, the execu-

tive may exercise his option to buy stock or sell his right to the option,
If he does the former, the plan is the same as the stock option plan,

If

he follows the latter course, he has not had to finance a stock purchase
but still has received some extra compensation at a lower tax rate than
if he had been given more cash salary,

On the other hand, he has not

become a proprietor with its attendant advantages.

Despite this disad-

vantage, the stock warrant plan may fit the financial needs of executives
in a particular firm better than the pure stock option and be the preferable method of the two.
Today one of the advantages of including stock options in the
compensation package of some key executives is the mere fact that many
companies do it.
is not,

While this sounds, at first, like simple

11

metooism 11 it

Essentially, it is a part of the general corporate policy of

providing compensation that is

11

at least comparable to that being paid

for similar positions in other firms in our industry."

Thus, the ability

and even the willingness of the corporation to offer a stock option to
executives who desire·or demand one, in itself, provides an advantage to
the company.
The second well recognized advantage that companies see in the
option plan is that it is one of the few compensation devices that tends
to be associated with the individual executive as a person,

Salary, for

example, is generally hemmed in by the position level and seniority as
well as the concept of internal compensation equity,

Bonuses, which

started on an individual performance basis, have gradually become institutionalized by class of employee or have been related to the profit
center concept,

The stock option, on the other hand, has more of the
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personal meaning of an executive contract.

It has the status, in most

firms, of acceptance into an exclusive club.
A third advantage, and one occuring in a number of firms during

the last two decades, is simply the possibility of making a highly valued
executive rich.

The stock option is a device that in many beginning com-

panies has been used in lieu of the old "share the profits" concept financial reward to the risk taking executive.

Both devices have been

used by directors to encourage entrepreneurial behavior by top company
executives.
A fourth major advantage is the common assumption by compensation

planners that restrictions placed on the exercise of options, e.g., purchase of 20% each year over five years from date of grant, induce executives to stay with the company,

Of course, the practice of granting

stock options serially can compound this effect over many years of a
mants career.

Another advantage cited by executives is the variety of purposes
served by options as a form of compensation,

For example, in a single

firm, stock options may be awarded from one plan to meet various needs,
such as .an outsized option being included in a new chief executive I s
contract to motivate him to turn the company's fortunes around.
Before leaving the discussion of stock options, the effects of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 should briefly be touched upon.

Prior to this

it was widely accepted that the stock option was by far the most popular
method of executive compensation.
The tax law affects options in several important ways.

Corpora-

tions have been allowed to grant stock options since 1951, and now more
than 90% of the largest U.S. industrial companies have some form of
"qualified plan."

In order to "qualify" for favorable IRS capital gains
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treatment, an option must be issued at 100% of market value, be exercised
within five years, and held for three years before sale.

Under the old

law, an executive paid no tax until he sold his stock, then paid a capital
gains tax of no more th~ 25% on the difference between his option price
and his selling price.
Beginning in 1972, the old rate will go up to a
all capital gains of more than $50,000.

35%

maximum for

But what really takes the most

out of the qualified option is a brand new provision.

Now, in the year

he exercises a qualified option, an executive must report the paper gain
between the option price and market price as tax preference income, even
though he still has to wait three to sell it for capital gains.
The figures begin to hurt when they get big enough to reduce the
"earned income" sheltered by the new

50%

maximum tax, thus shoving more

of that income into the ordinary 70% tax bracket.

The net effect is

that the higher the paper gain from exercising stock options, the bigger
the tax bill on salary and bonuses.
Stock Bonus
Stock bonus plans are those which provide for the giving of the
shares of stock to an executive as part of his total compensation.

This

not a tax saving plan, however, since the recipient must pay tax on the
market value of the stock in the year of receipt.

It's major advantage

is that the executive is given a share in the business which may accomplish certain of the objectives of stock option plans.
The stock bonuses employed by corporations come in several forms,
which in each instance they consist of awards made to the executives in
shares of his company's stock, the timing and duration of the payments
involved may vary considerably.

The variant which is easiest to handle
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is that in which, like a straight cash bonus there is but a single payment occuring at the end of the year during which the services that gave
rise to the bonus were performed,

Such a payment is taxed to the execu-

tive as ordinary income and valued for that purpose by the Internal
Revenue Service at the market price of the shares on the date they are
transferred,
would be.

This type of bonus may be treated just as a cash award

It is worth in after-tax terms the gross market value of the

stock received minus the applicable tax liability and its "after tax
current equivalent" is simply that same amount.
A second common arrangement is also very much like a form of cash
bonus.

In it, payments are spread over a period of several years immed-

iately following the award year rather than being made in a single lump
sum,

A series of four or five equal annual installments is the most fre-

quent choice.

In this case again, the installments are taxed as ordinary

income at their market value when received, and therefore their after-tax
current equivalent will be defined as the corresponding series of net
additions to salary.

The only difference between this device and that in

which the bonus is in the form of cash is that the final value of the
award is not fixed at the time it is made but instead depends in part on
stock price developments during the next few years,

This means that it

is necessary to record the price of the firm's stock on four or five
1i:!

separate dates rather than on just one in order to construct the desired
current equivalent.

This is a simple task, however, and merely implies

that the appropriate alternative to this kind of stock bonus is conceived
to be a series of salary increments which themselves are a function of
the firm's stock price over time,

There is nothing conceptually incorrect

or even inconvenient in such an arrangement.

\jl'1
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The third variety of stock bonus is really just another form of
deferred compensation.

Rather than a given amount of cash being set

aside for payment to the executive following his retirement, a given
number of shares of stock are so allocated.

Thus, the executive may

stand to receive a series of stock allotments beginning at age

65,

con-

tinuing for a specified number of years, and taxable at ordinary income
rates.

If he should die before attaining retirement age or thereafter

before receiving his bonus in full, his estate is entitled to the remaining shares.

As is evident, the difference again between such a promise

and a cash payment contract is the dependence of the value of the ultimate receipt on interim stock price movements.

However, since the ob-

jective is to derive a current income equivalent which applies as all
previous ones have, only to the executive's active working life, it is
not possible to wait until the time of each scheduled receipt of stock
before fixing the amount of that equivalent.

An alternative must be

designed which, as in the case of a stock option, anticipates the final
outcome.

The approach that is suggested here defines the after tax cur-

rent equivalent of a deferred stock bonus to be a series of annual salary
increments which:

(1) begin in the year the bonus is awarded; (2) con-

tinue to the executive's normal retirement age; (3) have the same prospective after tax present value as that estimated for the deferred
bonus payments;

(4)

are revised each year in response to any change in

this estimate.
For example, suppose that, in 1950 an executive age

50 is promised

a deferred stock bonus of 1,000 shares per year in each of the first five
years following his retirement at age

65.

the market price of his firm's stock is

At the time of this promise

$25 per share. The initial esti-

mate of the ultimate value of his bonus is therefore

$25,000 per year,
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before taxes, for five years.

Given the size of the man's salary in

1950 some "outside income" may be projected for him in retirement.

With

that figure and an estimate of deductions and exceptions, the after tax
value of the five bonus payments can be determined, as in the case of a
conventional deferred compensation arrangement.

The present value of

this expectation as of 1950 is then calculated, and the first stage of
the after tax equivalent specified to be simply that series of fifteen
equal annual additions to after tax salary which, if received from 1950
through 1964, would have the same present value.

The amount of the cur-

rent equivalent for the year 1950 is,accordingly, the first payment in
the series.

Suppose further that, in 1951, the stock rises in price to

$JO per share.

Our estimate of the worth of the deferred bonus is now

revised upward by $5,000 per year, the additional after tax present value
implied by that revision computed, and a second stream of fourteen payments established having a.present value equal to the increment.

The

current equivalent for 1951 is then the sum of this new figure plus the
one from the 1950 calculations.
to and including age

The process is repeated every year up

65, the results being a current equivalent con-

sisting once again of a number of overlapping "layers" and covering the
full time period from the date of the bonus arrangement is instituted
up to the executive's retirement.

By this latter date, the executive

will have been credited with extra income over the years equal in value
to that dollar amount which, after taxes, his bonus now promises him.
He, therefore, will have been made as well off, which is the test here
of equivalence.

The effect, then, is to consider the deferred stock

bonus to be simply a deferred compensation contract which happens to require not just one but a series of appraisals in order to be analyzed
completely.
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Stock Purchase
Stock purchase plans offers the executive an opportunity to buy
company stock at a fixed price,

If the executive accepts, he commits

himself to buy a definite number of shares at the price offered.

Many

organizations help the executive finance his purchases by permitting him
to pay for the stock over a period of time, advancing funds to him which
are repayable through payroll deductions, and lending him the money outright at low interest rates.

A number of plans offer the stock at a

"special price" (lower than market) and some include an agreement that
the company will buy back the stock at the price the executive paid even
though its value has declined.
The primary purpose of stock purchase plans is to encourage ownership in the company which, hopefully, will stimulate better performance
and continuity of employment.

However, stock purchase plans have been

superceded since 1950 in many organizations by the stock option plan,
While there is considerable disagreement as to the relative
merits of employee stock ownership programs, proponents can point to a
number of practical corporate uses for such plans, among them being their
use:

1, As an incentive to increased employee interest in, participation
in, identification with, or loyalty to a company.
2. As a means of transferring ownership to succeeding employee
generations or providing business continuation, particularly
in close held corporations

3, As a method to raise capital, without resorting to outside
sources or control or to create an internal market for company
stock,

4, As a device in certain types of plans for maintaining internal
control of a company,l
1

James B. Zischke, "New Developments in Employee Profit Sharing,
Stock Purchase, and Time Plans," Employee Bonds and Pension Management
(November 1964), pp. 30-32,
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There are various routes open for the development of employee
stock purchase programs.

Of these, the most advantageous for purposes

of any broadly based plan is usually the qualified Section 401(2) plan.

'

1,

1'his route, normally utilizing the profit sharing vehicle (but sometimes
organized technically as a "pension" or "stock bonus" plan for qualification purposes), offers a number of special advantages, particularly
from the tax standpoint.

It is the only stock purchase arrangement which

can work entirely with before tax earnings dollars of both the employee
and the corporation.

It is an arrangement, once established, which can

be continued automatically in the future.

And of considerable import to

the employees, special tax treatment accorded distributions from Section

401 (2) stock purchase plans can, in effect, permit "employee owners" to
pass on their share of any appreciation in the value of a business on
either an income tax free or estate tax free basis,

. ,.,,
'11:
I

Besides this, several other methods of employee stock purchase,
utilizing the option approach, have to some extent been clarified by the
Internal Revenue Code Amendments of 1964.

The first of these is the

qualified stock option plan (Section 422 plan); this is a successor to
the former restricted stock option.

While there is little question that

the rules of the new Section 422 destroy much of the value of stock
options as a compensation device, they are not nearly so onerous where
the objective is to provide a device whereby selected employees can acquire a proprietary stock interest in the business.
A second option route laid out by the 1964 Act is the so called
employee stock purchase plan (Section 423 plan).

This particular addi-

tion to the field of employee stock purchase is of highly questionable
value from the corporate standpoint, except perhaps in very specialized

I,
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situations.

Not only does this largely new section of the code introduce

considerable confusion into the terminology of employee stock purchase
plans (by usurping the name "employee stock purchase plan" for an arrangement which is really an option plan and furthermore representative, at
best, of a small proportion of employee stock purchase arrangements) but
it also creates what may be a dangerous precedent by introducing for the
first time into the legal framework of corporate employee benefit plans
the concept that a plan, in order to be viewed favorably, must cover
generally all full time employees.
In the area of direct purchase programs, that is, those plans
which provide systems whereby stock or purchase arrangements are made
available to employees for acquisition of shares on a direct basis, a
recent innovation of certain of the stock brokerage houses appears to
offer considerable potential for those corporations with a traded stock
which wish to set up relatively simple plans for employee stock purchase.
Under these systems, an employee subscribes through payroll deduction;
block purchases of stock are made by the broker; and share interests are
broken down by the broker into individual investment accounts for each
employee.

The employee may continue to accumulate his account with the

broker, or at any time take any of the actions (such as sale, request
for issuance of certificates in his name, and so on) that any other person maintaining an account with the broker might do.

The primary advant-

ages of the system are simplicity, freedom to the corporation from any
administrative or record keeping details other than payroll deduction,
and considerable savings to the employee in investment costs over those
which he would normally incur in small lot purchases.

There is also

little cost to the corporation in establishing such a program, other than

! :

20
a nominal service charge which may be rn_ade by the broker for record keep·ing activities.
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CHAPTER III

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined five basic plans.

Emphasis has been

placed on what each of the plans are and how they are used.

Addition-

ally, an attempt has been made to point out the advantages and disadvantages of each, both to the employee and the employer.

In the course

of the discussion no attempt has been made to determine which of the
plans is the "best," but rather to explain what they are and how they
are used.
In phantom stock, it was noted that this plan gave some of the
advantages of stock ownership but does not result in any stock transfer.
There is no risk to the employee and the performance shares are paid out
of dividends.

This plan is advantageous to the employee for tax purposes

since there normally is no tax payment until after retirement and then
at ordinary income rates.
courage continuity

It motivates executives by attempting to en-

of employment.

The implications for the employer

are that it does not have to transfer ownership and it is tax deductible
when paid out.
The stock option is perhaps the most widely used form of executive compensation.

There are also innumerable variations of this plan.

The executive can benefit by owning a portion of the company and once
the option is exercised it can not be terminated.

Although this is a

personal type of motivation, the plan has been adversely affected by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.

Although it must transfer ownership and the
21
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stock is not tax deductible, it does provide the company an alternate
means of raising funds.
The stock warrant plan may be used like a stock option or the
warrant itself can be sold by the employee.

It is advantageous to the

employee because if exercised, it can not be terminated and it is a personal motivation.

It is advantageous to the employer because it has the

potential for raising capital.
The stock bonus plan provides for the giving of the shares of
stock to an executive as part of his total compensation.

It is advanta-

geous to the employee because he is given ownership in the company and
taxed as ordinary income.

It is advantageous to the company because this

plan can easily be tied to the rrprofit-center" approach to measuring excutive performance.
The stock purchase plan, although normally open to all employees,
transfers ownership, can not be terminated, and may be paid for by payroll deductions.

For the company, this is the best of the four methods

for raising capital and is normally free of administrative detail since
this is normally handled through a stockbroker.
To give an encapsulated view of this entire paper, exhibits 1 and
2 are attached.

The purpose of these exhibits are to highlight and to

delineate the differences of the five basic plans discussed in this paper.
Exhibit 1 will describe the implications of these stock plans from the
point of view of the employee.

Exhibit 2 will describe the implications

of these plans from the point of view of the employer.

EXHIBIT 1
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYEE

Type of
Plan
Bases
For
Comparison

Phantom
Stock

Transfer of
Ownership

No

Effected by
Market

No; paid out of
Dividends

Cost or Risk
to Employee
Duration of
Bonus/Termination

None
May be terminated i f executive I s performance fails
to measure up
or employment
is terminated

Stock Options
b. Warrants
a. Option

Stock
Bonus

Yes; if exercis- Yes; if not sold Yes; has
mortality
ed or option can to third party
transfer.
be transferred
to estate.

Stock
Purchase

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes; if exercised

Yes

Yes

Yes

May not be
terminated i f
exercised.

May not be termi- May not be May not be terminated if already terminated nated
bought or sold.
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EXHIBIT 1-Continued
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYEE

Type of
Plan

Phantom
Stock

Stock Options
b. Warrant
a. Option

Normally pays no
tax until after
retirement, then
at ordinary income rates.

Taxed as tax
If exercised,
preferrance intaxed as capicome even though tal gain
he has to wait
3 years to sell
for capital gains

Scope of
Participation

Executives

Duration of
Payment or
Option

Varies

Type of
Motivation

Encourages
Continuity of
Employment.

Bases
For
Comparison
'

Taxation:
Ordinary
vs.
Capital gains

··-::a.'.::'~cc·.c~----"-=:C""--

_-;~_-_:..::::~·-:_::..,~-

~:-·····- c--

Stock
Purchase

Taxed in
year of receipt. Taxed
as ordinary
income and
valued at
market price

Works on before
tax-earning dollar.
Can be either income tax free or
estate free basis.

Normally limited Executives
to top echelon of
management

Executives

many cases,
must be open to
all employees.

Can be up to 10
years

Varies

May vary
Considerably

Can be immediate
or by payroll
deductions

Has personal

Has personal
meaning

Now mostly
related to
"profitcenter 11 concept

Although gives
ownership it is not
personal because
it is normally opm
to all employees.
Encourages continuity of employment.

--- ---------~ In

~~----···-----·--··

--.,,-:e:--

stock
Bonus

meaning.
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EXHIBIT 2
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYER

Type of
Plan
Bases
For
Comparison

Phantom
Stock

Company ownership transferred

No; paid out of
dividend

Potential for
Raising Capital

None

Stock
Bonus

Stock
Purchase

Yes; if exercised

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Stock Options
b, Warrant
a. Option

Yes; if exercised
Yes

Provides incen- Yes; on an inditive to manage- vidual basis
ment

Yes; on an indi- Yes; on an indi- yes; on an
vidual basis
vidual basis
individual
basis

Tax deductible
Cost to firm/
ease of J\dmini- when money paid
out. Must be
stration
kept in bookkeeping units.

Not tax
deductible

Not tax
deductible

Best of the four
methods for raising capital
Yes; but normally
open to all employees

Firm usually free
Details
of administrative
normally
details.
Handled
done by the
by
stock
broker.
company.
Common stock (Only nominal
Service Charge).
generally
Works
on before
offered.
tax-earning dolla:rs
"-'

\;1_

SEIECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
"A Confusing Payday for Men at the Top, 11 Business Week, January 23, 1971,

PP• 50-53.
American Management Association. Employee Benefit and Pension Management. New York, N. Y. 196
Golightly, Henry O. "Personalizing Executive Compensation: The Perfect
Pay Package." Business Management, July, 1969. pp. 101-103.
Lanham, Elizabeth. Administration of Wages and Salaries.
Harper and Row, 1963.

New York:

Lewellen, Wilbur G. Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
"Performance Shares:

Popular - but Under Fire," Business Week, May

5,

1973, P• 56.
"Phantom Stock:

Better than Options?", Dun's, September, 1970, pp. 33-35.

Saunders, Robert 0, Jr. "Its Cleanout Time for Executive Compensation,"
Business Management, March, 1971, pp. 43-48.
New York, N.Y. 1967.

The Conference Board.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans.

The Conference Board.
N.Y. 1970.

Qualified Stock Options for Executives.

The Conference Board.

Top Executive Compensation.

I

New York,

New York, N. Y. 1970.

"Top men Demand New Kinds of Pay, 11 Business Week, January 23, 1971,
pp. 76-81.

11

,Ii

26

Ir
I
I

na· !l')j:".'.C'.O"·\/
..,,\_t.P.\.)f"·

o~
.,

""l"'b,1Y:
!·,t.-

u

I'.'

.~.-!,,

t.

{f,

.f1.tc•.-

l\i! Fore•: In5·;;i!.:1;'1:t· of Tecbnolog~.
I..iibrary
Mi.nDt Mr }.';.,ri.:r1 Ba$~ Br'knclI

658.4
M346
Markline - Stock options

658.4
M346
Markl ine, Charles K
Stock options

